cvs commit: patches/tcp_wrappers tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared-lib-plus-plus.patch

jim at linuxfromscratch.org jim at linuxfromscratch.org
Mon Jun 7 22:08:52 PDT 2004


jim         04/06/07 23:08:52

  Added:       tcp_wrappers tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch
  Removed:     tcp_wrappers tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared-lib-plus-plus.patch
  Log:
  Naming Scheme Update
  
  Revision  Changes    Path
  1.1                  patches/tcp_wrappers/tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch
  
  Index: tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch
  ===================================================================
  Submitted By: Tushar Teredesai <tushar at linuxfromscratch.org>
  Date: 2003-10-04
  Initial Package Version: 7.6
  Origin: http://archives.linuxfromscratch.org/mail-archives/blfs-dev/2003-January/001960.html
  Description: The patch was created from the tcp_wrappers modified package by Mark Heerdink.
  This patch provides the following improvements:
      * Install libwrap.so along with libwrap.a.
      * Create an install target for tcp_wrappers.
      * Compilation and security fixes.
      * Documentation fixes.
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile	1997-03-21 12:27:21.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile	2002-07-15 16:07:21.000000000 -0500
  @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
  +GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h)
  +
   # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20
   
  +# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable
  +HOSTNAME =
  +
   what:
   	@echo
   	@echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:"
  @@ -19,7 +24,7 @@
   	@echo "	generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)"
   	@echo "	386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543"
   	@echo "	dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix"
  -	@echo "	linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
  +	@echo "	linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
   	@echo "	ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4"
   	@echo "	sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2"
   	@echo "	uts215 uxp"
  @@ -43,8 +48,8 @@
   # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx
   #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc
   #
  -# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX
  -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
  +# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux
  +REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
   #
   # BSD 4.4
   #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec
  @@ -141,10 +146,21 @@
   	LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \
   	EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all
   
  +ifneq ($(GLIBC),0)
  +MYLIB=-lnsl
  +endif
  +
   linux:
   	@make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
  -	LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \
  -	NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all
  +	LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
  +	NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
  +	EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
  +
  +gnu:
  +	@make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
  +	LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
  +	NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
  +	EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
   
   # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x.
   hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10:
  @@ -391,7 +407,7 @@
   # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module
   # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv().
   
  -AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
  +#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
   #AUX_OBJ= environ.o
   #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o
   
  @@ -454,7 +470,8 @@
   # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work
   # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions.
   
  -BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
  +BUGS =
  +#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
   #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG
   #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG
   
  @@ -464,7 +481,7 @@
   # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following
   # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control.
   #
  -#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
  +NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
   
   ###############################################################
   # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog()
  @@ -491,7 +508,7 @@
   # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions
   # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn).
   # 
  -#STYLE	= -DPROCESS_OPTIONS	# Enable language extensions.
  +STYLE	= -DPROCESS_OPTIONS	# Enable language extensions.
   
   ################################################################
   # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records
  @@ -514,7 +531,7 @@
   #
   # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file.
   
  -FACILITY= LOG_MAIL	# LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
  +FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON	# LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
   
   # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged.
   
  @@ -610,7 +627,7 @@
   # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname
   # lookups altogether, see the next section.
   
  -PARANOID= -DPARANOID
  +#PARANOID= -DPARANOID
   
   ########################################
   # Optional: turning off hostname lookups
  @@ -623,7 +640,7 @@
   # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid
   # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition.
   
  -HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
  +#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
   
   #############################################
   # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking
  @@ -649,28 +666,46 @@
   # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives,
   # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details.
   #
  -# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
  +KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
   
   ## End configuration options
   ############################
   
   # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs.
   
  +CC	= gcc
   SHELL	= /bin/sh
  -.c.o:;	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
  +.c.o:;	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c
  +
  +SOMAJOR = 0
  +SOMINOR = 7.6
  +
  +LIB	= libwrap.a
  +SHLIB	= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR)
  +SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR)
  +SHLIBSO	= shared/libwrap.so
  +SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap
   
  -CFLAGS	= -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
  +shared/%.o: %.c
  +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
  +
  +CFLAGS	= -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
   	$(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \
   	-DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \
   	-DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \
   	$(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \
   	$(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME)
   
  +SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS)
  +SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT
  +
   LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \
   	hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \
   	$(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \
   	update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o
   
  +SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ));
  +
   FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o
   
   KIT	= README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \
  @@ -684,46 +719,80 @@
   	refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \
   	scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS
   
  -LIB	= libwrap.a
  -
  -all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk
  +all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB)
   
   # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed.
   
   config-check:
   	@set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; }
  -	@set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
  -	if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
  -	then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
  -	else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \
  +	@set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \
  +	if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \
  +	then rm cflags.new ; \
  +	else mv cflags.new cflags ; \
   	fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
  +	@if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi
   
   $(LIB):	$(LIB_OBJ)
   	rm -f $(LIB)
   	$(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ)
   	-$(RANLIB) $(LIB)
   
  -tcpd:	tcpd.o $(LIB)
  -	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
  +$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ)
  +	rm -f $(SHLIB)
  +	$(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ)
  +	ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ)
  +	ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO)
  +
  +tcpd:	tcpd.o $(SHLIB)
  +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
   
  -miscd:	miscd.o $(LIB)
  -	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
  +miscd:	miscd.o $(SHLIB)
  +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
   
  -safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB)
  -	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
  +safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB)
  +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
   
   TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
   
  -tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB)
  -	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
  +tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
  +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
   
  -try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB)
  -	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
  +try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB)
  +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
   
   TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
   
  -tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB)
  -	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
  +tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
  +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
  +
  +install: install-lib install-bin install-dev
  +
  +install-lib:
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
  +	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ))
  +	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO))
  +
  +install-bin:
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
  +
  +install-dev:
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/
  +	install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
  +	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3
  +	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3
  +	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3
   
   shar:	$(KIT)
   	@shar $(KIT)
  @@ -739,7 +808,8 @@
   
   clean:
   	rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \
  -	cflags
  +	cflags libwrap*.so*
  +	rm -rf shared
   
   tidy:	clean
   	chmod -R a+r .
  @@ -885,5 +955,6 @@
   update.o: mystdarg.h
   update.o: tcpd.h
   vfprintf.o: cflags
  +weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h
   workarounds.o: cflags
   workarounds.o: tcpd.h
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c	1997-04-07 19:29:19.000000000 -0500
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -35,7 +35,12 @@
   #ifdef IP_OPTIONS
       unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp;
       char    lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp;
  +#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
       int     optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto;
  +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
  +    size_t  optsize = sizeof(optbuf);
  +    int     ipproto;
  +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
       struct protoent *ip;
       int     fd = request->fd;
       unsigned int opt;
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3	1996-02-11 10:01:27.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library
   .SH SYNOPSIS
   .nf
  -#include "tcpd.h"
  +#include <tcpd.h>
   
   extern int allow_severity;
   extern int deny_severity;
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5	1995-01-30 12:51:47.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
   impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
   quick introduction.
   .PP
  -An extended version of the access control language is described in the
  -\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
  -program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
  +The extended version of the access control language is described in the
  +\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes
  +the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR
   .PP
   In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a
   network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
  @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
   character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
   easier to edit.
   .IP \(bu
  -Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
  +Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored.
   This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
   are easier to read.
   .IP \(bu
  @@ -69,26 +69,33 @@
   .SH PATTERNS
   The access control language implements the following patterns:
   .IP \(bu
  -A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
  +A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if
   the last components of its name match the specified pattern.  For
  -example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
  -`wzv.win.tue.nl\'.
  +example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
  +`wzv.win.tue.nl'.
   .IP \(bu
  -A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
  +A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if
   its first numeric fields match the given string.  For example, the
  -pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
  +pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
   Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
   .IP \(bu
  -A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
  +A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS
   (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
   member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
   for daemon process names or for client user names.
   .IP \(bu
  -An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
  -`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
  -bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
  -pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
  -range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
  +An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
  +`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the
  +bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask
  +pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the
  +range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
  +.IP \(bu
  +A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file
  +name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name
  +or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is
  +zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns
  +separated by whitespace.  A file name pattern can be used anywhere
  +a host name or address pattern can be used.
   .SH WILDCARDS
   The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
   .IP ALL
  @@ -115,19 +122,19 @@
   .ne 6
   .SH OPERATORS
   .IP EXCEPT
  -Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
  +Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct
   matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
   \fIlist_2\fR.  The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
   client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
  -language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
  -would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
  +language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c'
  +would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'.
   .br
   .ne 6
   .SH SHELL COMMANDS
   If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
   command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
   The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard
  -input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR.  Specify an `&\'
  +input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR.  Specify an `&'
   at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
   completed.
   .PP
  @@ -159,7 +166,7 @@
   .IP %u
   The client user name (or "unknown").
   .IP %%
  -Expands to a single `%\' character.
  +Expands to a single `%' character.
   .PP
   Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
   underscores.
  @@ -243,9 +250,9 @@
   less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
   client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
   harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
  -the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
  +the client's IDENT server is lying.
   .PP
  -Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. 
  +Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services. 
   .SH EXAMPLES
   The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
   policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
  @@ -285,7 +292,7 @@
   .br
   ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
   .PP
  -The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
  +The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
   in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
   netgroup.  The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
   \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
  @@ -322,8 +329,8 @@
   /etc/hosts.deny:
   .in +3
   .nf
  -in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
  -	/usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
  +in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
  +	/usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
   .fi
   .PP
   The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
  @@ -349,7 +356,7 @@
   capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
   terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
   expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
  -that shouldn\'t.  All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
  +that shouldn't.  All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
   .SH FILES
   .na
   .nf
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c	1997-02-11 19:13:23.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -240,6 +240,26 @@
       }
   }
   
  +/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */
  +
  +static int hostfile_match(path, host)
  +char   *path;
  +struct hosts_info *host;
  +{
  +    char    tok[BUFSIZ];
  +    int     match = NO;
  +    FILE   *fp;
  +
  +    if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) {
  +        while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host)))
  +            /* void */ ;
  +        fclose(fp);
  +    } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
  +        tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path);
  +    }
  +    return (match);
  +}
  +
   /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
   
   static int host_match(tok, host)
  @@ -267,6 +287,8 @@
   	tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled");	/* not tcpd_jump() */
   	return (NO);
   #endif
  +    } else if (tok[0] == '/') {                         /* /file hack */
  +        return (hostfile_match(tok, host));
       } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) {		/* check address and name */
   	char   *name = eval_hostname(host);
   	return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5	1994-12-28 10:42:29.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -58,12 +58,12 @@
   Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after
   performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5)
   manual page.  The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr
  -connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the
  +connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the
   conversation with the client host. Example:
   .sp
   .nf
   .ti +3
  -spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) &
  +spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) &
   .fi
   .sp
   executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c	1996-02-11 10:01:32.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -473,6 +473,9 @@
   #ifdef LOG_CRON
       "cron", LOG_CRON,
   #endif
  +#ifdef LOG_FTP
  +    "ftp", LOG_FTP,
  +#endif
   #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0
       "local0", LOG_LOCAL0,
   #endif
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c	1994-12-28 10:42:37.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
   #include <string.h>
   
   extern int errno;
  -#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED
  +#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR)
   extern char *sys_errlist[];
   extern int sys_nerr;
   #endif
  @@ -29,11 +29,15 @@
   
       while (*bp = *cp)
   	if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') {
  +#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR
  +            strcpy(bp, strerror(errno));
  +#else
   	    if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) {
   		strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]);
   	    } else {
   		sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno);
   	    }
  +#endif
   	    bp += strlen(bp);
   	    cp += 2;
   	} else {
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c	1995-01-02 09:11:34.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
   
   int     rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */
   
  -static jmp_buf timebuf;
  +static sigjmp_buf timebuf;
   
   /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */
   
  @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
   static void timeout(sig)
   int     sig;
   {
  -    longjmp(timebuf, sig);
  +    siglongjmp(timebuf, sig);
   }
   
   /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */
  @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
   	 * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server.
   	 */
   
  -	if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) {
  +	if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) {
   	    signal(SIGALRM, timeout);
   	    alarm(rfc931_timeout);
   
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8	1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
  +.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
  +.SH NAME
  +safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff
  +from finger servers
  +.SH SYNOPSIS
  +.B safe_finger [finger_options]
  +.SH DESCRIPTION
  +The
  +.B safe_finger
  +command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this
  +program for automatic reverse finger probes from the
  +.B tcp_wrapper
  +.B (tcpd)
  +, not the raw finger command. The
  +.B safe_finger
  +command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root
  +privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH
  +environment.
  +.B safe_finger
  +will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some
  +finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in
  +the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere
  +on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps
  +sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines.
  +The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged.
  +.B safe_finger
  +takes care of all this badness.
  +.SH SEE ALSO
  +.BR hosts_access (5),
  +.BR hosts_options (5),
  +.BR tcpd (8)
  +.SH AUTHOR
  +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
  +
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c	1994-12-28 10:42:42.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -26,21 +26,24 @@
   #include <stdio.h>
   #include <ctype.h>
   #include <pwd.h>
  +#include <syslog.h>
   
   extern void exit();
   
   /* Local stuff */
   
  -char    path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin";
  +char    path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin";
   
   #define	TIME_LIMIT	60		/* Do not keep listinging forever */
   #define	INPUT_LENGTH	100000		/* Do not keep listinging forever */
   #define	LINE_LENGTH	128		/* Editors can choke on long lines */
   #define	FINGER_PROGRAM	"finger"	/* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */
   #define	UNPRIV_NAME	"nobody"	/* Preferred privilege level */
  -#define	UNPRIV_UGID	32767		/* Default uid and gid */
  +#define	UNPRIV_UGID	65534		/* Default uid and gid */
   
   int     finger_pid;
  +int	allow_severity = SEVERITY;
  +int	deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
   
   void    cleanup(sig)
   int     sig;
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c	1997-03-21 12:27:24.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -180,10 +180,12 @@
   
   /* ARGSUSED */
   
  -void    rfc931(request)
  -struct request_info *request;
  +void    rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest)
  +struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin;
  +struct sockaddr_in *our_sin;
  +char   *dest;
   {
  -    strcpy(request->user, unknown);
  +    strcpy(dest, unknown);
   }
   
   /* check_path - examine accessibility */
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c	1997-03-21 12:27:25.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -76,7 +76,11 @@
   {
       static struct sockaddr_in client;
       static struct sockaddr_in server;
  +#if !defined (__GLIBC__)
       int     len;
  +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
  +    size_t  len;
  +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
       char    buf[BUFSIZ];
       int     fd = request->fd;
   
  @@ -224,7 +228,11 @@
   {
       char    buf[BUFSIZ];
       struct sockaddr_in sin;
  +#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
       int     size = sizeof(sin);
  +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
  +    size_t  size = sizeof(sin);
  +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
   
       /*
        * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8	1996-02-21 09:39:16.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
   .PP
   The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
   systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have
  -no `in.\' prefix to their name.
  +no `in.' prefix to their name.
   .SH EXAMPLE 2
   This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons
   are left in their original place.
  @@ -110,26 +110,26 @@
   becomes:
   .sp
   .ti +5
  -finger  stream  tcp  nowait  nobody  /some/where/tcpd     in.fingerd
  +finger  stream  tcp  nowait  nobody  /usr/sbin/tcpd       in.fingerd
   .sp
   .fi
   .PP
   The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
   systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the
  -daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
  +daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
   field in the inetd configuration file.
   .PP
   Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be
  -covered by \fItcpd\fR.  Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
  +covered by \fItcpd\fR.  Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
   process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to
  -execute the `inetimp\' command.
  +execute the `inetimp' command.
   .SH EXAMPLE 3
   In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret"
   or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it
   specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
   .nf
   .sp
  -    ntalk  dgram  udp  wait  root  /some/where/tcpd  /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
  +    ntalk  dgram  udp  wait  root  /usr/sbin/tcpd  /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd
   .sp
   .fi
   .PP
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h	1996-03-19 09:22:25.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -4,6 +4,25 @@
     * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
     */
   
  +#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
  +#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
  +
  +/* someone else may have defined this */
  +#undef  __P
  +
  +/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */
  +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus)
  +#define __P(args)       args
  +#else
  +#define __P(args)       ()
  +#endif
  +
  +/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */
  +#include <netinet/in.h>
  +#include <stdio.h>
  +
  +__BEGIN_DECLS
  +
   /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */
   
   #define STRING_LENGTH	128		/* hosts, users, processes */
  @@ -25,10 +44,10 @@
       char    pid[10];			/* access via eval_pid(request) */
       struct host_info client[1];		/* client endpoint info */
       struct host_info server[1];		/* server endpoint info */
  -    void  (*sink) ();			/* datagram sink function or 0 */
  -    void  (*hostname) ();		/* address to printable hostname */
  -    void  (*hostaddr) ();		/* address to printable address */
  -    void  (*cleanup) ();		/* cleanup function or 0 */
  +    void  (*sink) __P((int));		/* datagram sink function or 0 */
  +    void  (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */
  +    void  (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */
  +    void  (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */
       struct netconfig *config;		/* netdir handle */
   };
   
  @@ -61,25 +80,30 @@
   /* Global functions. */
   
   #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
  -extern void fromhost();			/* get/validate client host info */
  +extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *));	/* get/validate client host info */
   #else
   #define fromhost sock_host		/* no TLI support needed */
   #endif
   
  -extern int hosts_access();		/* access control */
  -extern void shell_cmd();		/* execute shell command */
  -extern char *percent_x();		/* do %<char> expansion */
  -extern void rfc931();			/* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
  -extern void clean_exit();		/* clean up and exit */
  -extern void refuse();			/* clean up and exit */
  -extern char *xgets();			/* fgets() on steroids */
  -extern char *split_at();		/* strchr() and split */
  -extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr();	/* restricted inet_addr() */
  +extern void shell_cmd __P((char *));	/* execute shell command */
  +extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */
  +extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
  +extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
  +extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *));	/* clean up and exit */
  +extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *));	/* fgets() on steroids */
  +extern char *split_at __P((char *, int));	/* strchr() and split */
  +extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */
   
   /* Global variables. */
   
  +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
  +extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
  +extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
  +#else
   extern int allow_severity;		/* for connection logging */
   extern int deny_severity;		/* for connection logging */
  +#endif
  +
   extern char *hosts_allow_table;		/* for verification mode redirection */
   extern char *hosts_deny_table;		/* for verification mode redirection */
   extern int hosts_access_verbose;	/* for verbose matching mode */
  @@ -92,9 +116,14 @@
     */
   
   #ifdef __STDC__
  +extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request);
  +extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, 
  +                     char *client_user);
   extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...);
   extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...);
   #else
  +extern int hosts_access();
  +extern int hosts_ctl();
   extern struct request_info *request_init();	/* initialize request */
   extern struct request_info *request_set();	/* update request structure */
   #endif
  @@ -117,27 +146,31 @@
     * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results.
     */
   
  -extern char *eval_user();		/* client user */
  -extern char *eval_hostname();		/* printable hostname */
  -extern char *eval_hostaddr();		/* printable host address */
  -extern char *eval_hostinfo();		/* host name or address */
  -extern char *eval_client();		/* whatever is available */
  -extern char *eval_server();		/* whatever is available */
  +extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *));	/* client user */
  +extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *));	/* printable hostname */
  +extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *));	/* printable host address */
  +extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *));	/* host name or address */
  +extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *));	/* whatever is available */
  +extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *));	/* whatever is available */
   #define eval_daemon(r)	((r)->daemon)	/* daemon process name */
   #define eval_pid(r)	((r)->pid)	/* process id */
   
   /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */
   
  -extern void sock_host();		/* look up endpoint addresses */
  -extern void sock_hostname();		/* translate address to hostname */
  -extern void sock_hostaddr();		/* address to printable address */
  +/* look up endpoint addresses */
  +extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *));
  +/* translate address to hostname */
  +extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *));
  +/* address to printable address */
  +extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *));
  +
   #define sock_methods(r) \
   	{ (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; }
   
   /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */
   
   #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
  -extern void tli_host();			/* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
  +extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *));	/* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
   #endif
   
    /*
  @@ -178,7 +211,7 @@
     * behavior.
     */
   
  -extern void process_options();		/* execute options */
  +extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */
   extern int dry_run;			/* verification flag */
   
   /* Bug workarounds. */
  @@ -217,3 +250,7 @@
   #define strtok	my_strtok
   extern char *my_strtok();
   #endif
  +
  +__END_DECLS
  +
  +#endif /* tcpd.h */
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c	1997-02-11 19:13:25.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -350,6 +350,8 @@
   {
       if (pat[0] == '@') {
   	tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat);
  +    } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
  +        tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat);
       } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
   	tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat);
       } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
  @@ -382,6 +384,8 @@
   {
       if (pat[0] == '@') {			/* @netgroup */
   	tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat);
  +    } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
  +        tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat);
       } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
   	tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat);
       } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
  @@ -402,8 +406,13 @@
   static int check_host(pat)
   char   *pat;
   {
  +    char    buf[BUFSIZ];
       char   *mask;
       int     addr_count = 1;
  +    FILE   *fp;
  +    struct tcpd_context saved_context;
  +    char   *cp;
  +    char   *wsp = " \t\r\n";
   
       if (pat[0] == '@') {			/* @netgroup */
   #ifdef NO_NETGRENT
  @@ -422,6 +431,21 @@
   	tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled");
   #endif
   #endif
  +    } else if (pat[0] == '/') {                 /* /path/name */
  +        if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) {
  +            saved_context = tcpd_context;
  +            tcpd_context.file = pat;
  +            tcpd_context.line = 0;
  +            while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
  +                tcpd_context.line++;
  +                for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp))
  +                    check_host(cp);
  +            }
  +            tcpd_context = saved_context;
  +            fclose(fp);
  +        } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
  +            tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat);
  +        }
       } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) {	/* network/netmask */
   	if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE
   	    || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE)
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8	1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
  +.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
  +.SH NAME
  +try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper
  +.SH SYNOPSIS
  +.B try-from
  +.SH DESCRIPTION
  +The
  +.B try-from
  +command can be called via a remote shell command to find out
  +if the hostname and address are properly recognized
  +by the
  +.B tcp_wrapper
  +library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI
  +on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through
  +.BR syslog (3)
  +and redirected to stderr.
  +
  +Example:
  +
  +rsh host /some/where/try-from
  +
  +.SH SEE ALSO
  +.BR hosts_access (5),
  +.BR hosts_options (5),
  +.BR tcpd (8)
  +.SH AUTHOR
  +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
  +
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c	1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
  + /*
  +  * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50
  +  * 
  +  * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt at debian.org>
  +  */
  +
  +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
  +#include <syslog.h>
  +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
  +int allow_severity = SEVERITY; 
  +#endif
  diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c
  --- tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c	1996-03-19 09:22:26.000000000 -0600
  +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
  @@ -163,7 +163,11 @@
   int     fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len)
   int     sock;
   struct sockaddr *sa;
  +#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
   int    *len;
  +#else /* __GLIBC__ */
  +size_t *len;
  +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
   {
       int     ret;
       struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;
  
  
  



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